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For a broad class of models widely used in practice for choice and ranking data based on Luce's choice axiom, including the Bradley--Terry--Luce and Plackett--Luce models, we show that the associated maximum likelihood estimation problems are equivalent to a classic matrix balancing problem with target row and column sums. This perspective opens doors between two seemingly unrelated research areas, and allows us to unify existing algorithms in the choice modeling literature as special instances or analogs of Sinkhorn's celebrated algorithm for matrix balancing. We draw inspirations from these connections and resolve some open problems on the study of Sinkhorn's algorithm. We establish the global linear convergence of Sinkhorn's algorithm for non-negative matrices whenever finite scaling matrices exist, and characterize its linear convergence rate in terms of the algebraic connectivity of a weighted bipartite graph. We further derive the sharp asymptotic rate of linear convergence, which generalizes a classic result of Knight (2008). To our knowledge, these are the first quantitative linear convergence results for Sinkhorn's algorithm for general non-negative matrices and positive marginals. Our results highlight the importance of connectivity and orthogonality structures in matrix balancing and Sinkhorn's algorithm, which could be of independent interest. More broadly, the connections we establish in this paper between matrix balancing and choice modeling could also help motivate further transmission of ideas and lead to interesting results in both disciplines. 

Abstract We analyze the effects of taxation in two‐sided matching markets where agents have heterogeneous preferences over potential partners. Our model provides a continuous link between models of matching with and without transfers. Taxes generate inefficiency on the allocative margin, by changing who matches with whom. This allocative inefficiency can be nonmonotonic, but is weakly increasing in the tax rate under linear taxation if each worker has negative nonpecuniary utility of working. We adapt existing econometric methods for markets without taxes to our setting, and estimate preferences in the college‐coach football market. We show through simulations that standard methods inaccurately measure deadweight loss. 

Abstract In this paper, we address the problem of estimating transport surplus (a.k.a. matching affinity) in high-dimensional optimal transport problems. Classical optimal transport theory specifies the matching affinity and determines the optimal joint distribution. In contrast, we study the inverse problem of estimating matching affinity based on the observation of the joint distribution, using an entropic regularization of the problem. To accommodate high dimensionality of the data, we propose a novel method that incorporates a nuclear norm regularization that effectively enforces a rank constraint on the affinity matrix. The low-rank matrix estimated in this way reveals the main factors that are relevant for matching.